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ANALYSIS OF WOODS AND MYBURGH
COMMENTS ON CAB
Jonathan Band1
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Jonathan Band is a copyright lawyer in Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed in this
paper are his own and should not be attributed to any of his clients.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 16, 2020, President Ramaphosa of the South African Republic
referred the Copyright Amendment Bill (“CAB”) back to the National
Assembly on the grounds that he had reservations concerning its
constitutionality. In his referral letter, President Ramaphosa stated that the
CAB may be in conflict with international intellectual property (IP) treaties
South Africa had joined or was planning to join. CAB opponents’ arguments
that the CAB is incompatible with IP treaties are based largely on comments
prepared by Michele Woods, Director of the Copyright Law Division of the
World Intellectual Property Organization, in 2018. Woods prepared these
comments as a member of a panel of experts appointed by the Portfolio
Committee of the South African Parliament to review the CAB. Woods stated
that the comments reflected her views and are not official WIPO
interpretations of international treaty obligations.
Additionally, CAB opponents cite comments prepared by Andre
Myburgh, a South African attorney, for the Portfolio committee, which
likewise argue that the CAB is incompatible with IP treaties.
A close examination of the Woods and Myburgh comments reveal that
they failed to prove their contentions that the CAB’s provisions are
inconsistent with IP treaties. Moreover, the comments are inconsistent with
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one another on critical points, such as fair use.
DISTRIBUTION, RENTAL, AND MAKING AVAILABLE
Woods claims that the CAB does not provide an exclusive right of
distribution nor a software rental right as required by the WIPO Copyright
Treaty (“WCT”). Woods evidently overlooked section 23(2)(c) of the
underlying Copyright Act of 1978, which provides that “copyright shall be
infringed by any person who, without license of the owner of the copyright
and at a time when copyright subsists in a work…distributes in the Republic
any article for the purposes of trade, or for any other purpose, to such an
extent that the owner of the copyright in question in prejudicially affected.”
Similarly, section 23(2)(b) of the 1978 Act specifies that copyright shall be
infringed by a person who “sells, lets, or by way of trade offers or exposes
for sale or hire in the Republic any article….”
Myburgh asserts that the CAB repeals section 23(2)(b) of the 1978 Act,
but it does nothing of the sort. It appears that he misread clause 26 of the
CAB to have that effect. Even if the CAB did repeal section 23(2)(b), which
it did not, the CAB unquestionably left intact section 23(2)(c), which
establishes a distribution right.
Myburgh asserts that the CAB fails to provide exclusive rights of
communication to the public and making available with respect to software.
But section 11B of the 1978 provides the owners of a copyright in software
the exclusive right to reproduce, publish, perform, broadcast, cause the
software to be transmitted in a diffusion service, or lend the software. Further,
as noted above, section 23(2)(b) of the 1978 provides an exclusive right to
sell a copyrighted work, and section 23(2)(c) provides an exclusive right to a
copyrighted work. In short, South African copyright law already provides
software with the full panoply of rights required by the WCT.
Myburgh also asserts that the CAB is in conflict with Article 14 of the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”) because the making
available right for sound recordings in section 9A(1)(a)(iv) is a “remuneration
right” rather than an “exclusive right.” But Article 15 of WPPT allows a
country to establish a right to remuneration for communications to the public,
and Article 8 of the WCT makes clear that the making available right is a
subset of the communication to the public right. Hence, countries are
permitted consistent with WPPT to allow the making available of a sound
recording subject to remuneration. More generally, the Berne Convention
permits compulsory licenses for broadcasts and communications to the
public. 2 Further, Article 13(1) of the Berne Conventions authorizes equitable
remuneration for musical works.

2

See Article 11bis(2).
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EXCEPTIONS
Before proceeding to the issues raised by Woods and Myburgh
concerning the exceptions in the CAB, it must be noted that Woods did not
raise any objections to the CAB’s adoption of a flexible fair use test based on
the fair use right found in the U.S. Copyright Act. Nor did she criticize the
CAB’s “hybrid” approach of combining a flexible fair use provision with
specific exceptions. Fair use, however, has been the most controversial aspect
of the CAB, and the focus of much the opposition to its enactment. CAB
opponents routinely contend that fair use is inconsistent with South Africa’s
treaty obligations. Yet, Woods sees no treaty problems created by the fair use
provision, nor the hybrid approach of which it is a part.
In contrast, Myburgh dwells on the incompatibility of fair use and the
CAB’s hybrid approach with IP treaties. On this point, Woods is right and
Myburgh is wrong. If a hybrid of a flexible fair use provision and specific
exceptions were incompatible with IP treaties, then leading IP producers such
as the United States, Canada, Singapore, Korea, and Israel would all violate
their treaty obligations. Every country that has adopted a flexible fair use
provision also has enacted a list of specific exceptions. 3 The legislatures in
all these jurisdictions have identified certain uses that always can be made,
while providing courts with the flexibility to allow other uses if warranted
under the circumstances. None of these countries’ hybrid structure has been
challenged before the WTO.
Quotation and Illustration
In connection to the quotation right in section 12B(1)(a), Woods indicates
that the phrase “compatible with fair practice” is “an additional condition
required by Art. 10(1) of the Berne Convention.” Similarly, in connection to
illustration for the purpose of teaching in section 12B(1)(b), Woods indicates
that the phrase “compatible with fair practice” is “an additional condition
required by Art. 10(2) of the Berne Convention.” Contrary to Woods’
suggestion, the Berne Convention does not require explicit inclusion of the
concept “compatible with fair practice” in national legislation. Rather, the
phrase serves as a standard by which to evaluate whether the exceptions for
quotations and illustrations in teaching are being applied fairly, or are being
applied so broadly that they swallow the author’s exclusive rights. Many
countries exceptions for quotations and illustration for teaching rights do not
include reference to “compatible with fair practice.” 4

3

In addition to those listed above, Liberia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and the
Philippines.
4
Myburgh suggests that the quotation right in CAB section 12B(1)(a) is incompatible with
the three-step test, discussed in the next section. However, under the Berne Convention, the
Article 10(1) quotation right is a mandatory exception that is not subject to the three-step
test. The incarnation of the three-step test in the TRIPS agreement arguably applies to
quotations, although it could be argued that at least short quotations did not fall within the
BAND
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Three-Step Test
Woods and Myburgh suggest that several of the exceptions contained in
the CAB do not comply with the “three-step test” set forth in the Berne
Convention and other international agreements. The three-step test, first
included in the 1967 revision of the Berne Convention, provides that “it shall
be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the
reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.” The
vague standards of the three-step test have been the source of much
controversy and debate in academic circles, but have been applied by an
international tribunal only once. Accordingly, there is little concrete guidance
concerning the meaning of the three-step test and how it should be applied.
As a result, the three-step test often is used in a conclusory manner to oppose
the adoption of an exception. After all, virtually any exception could be
described as conflicting with the normal exploitation of a work and as
prejudicing the legitimate interests of the author. Unfortunately, Woods’ and
Myburgh’s discussions of the exceptions for educational institutions and
libraries adopt this conclusory approach.
Additionally, their terse pronouncements concerning these exceptions fail
to consider the interests of other stakeholders. Such a consideration of the
interests of other stakeholders is supported by a declaration of IP scholars
convened by the Max Planck Institute on a “Balanced Interpretation of the
Three-Step Test in Copyright Law.” 5 The Declaration states that the threestep test
should be interpreted in a manner that respects the legitimate
interests of third parties, including
•

interests deriving from human rights and fundamental
freedoms;

•

interests in competition, notably on secondary markets;
and

•

other public interests, notably in scientific progress and
cultural, social, or economic development.

Further, the Declaration states “limitations and exceptions do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of protected subject matter, if they…are based on
important competing considerations….”

scope of exclusive rights in the first place, just as the distribution right with respect to a copy
is exhausted after the first sale of that copy.
5
https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-2-2010/2621/Declaration-Balanced-InterpretationOf-The-Three-Step-Test.pdf.
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1. Fair Use
Myburgh focused on the incompatibility of CAB’s fair use provision,
section 12A, with the three-step test. As noted above, Woods did not
challenge section 12A, presumably recognizing the folly of suggesting that a
central feature of U.S. copyright law was not Berne compatible. Myburgh
attempted to sidestep this problem by distinguishing CAB section 12A from
section 107 of the U.S. Code.
First, he noted that “section 107 is derived from, and inseparably linked
to, an extremely rich and complex case law, and it is only along with that case
law that it is meaningful.” He added that the “well-established case law is
indispensable to guarantee—along with other statutory provisions in the
Copyright Act—that the US copyright law is in accordance with the
international copyright provisions, and in particular, the cumulative
conditions of the Three-Step Test.” In other words, section 107 is three-step
compliant only because of the rich fair use jurisprudence in the United States.
Under this reasoning, no other country could permissibly enact a fair use
provision. But numerous other countries have, without being challenged
before the WTO for violating the TRIPS agreement, and without any increase
in infringement. To the extent that the U.S. case law is helpful in guiding
courts, South African courts could easily rely upon this case law until South
Africa courts develops their own fair use jurisprudence. This is exactly what
happened in Israel after it adopted a fair use exception in 2007. Moreover,
Israeli courts apply fair use more strictly that U.S. courts. 6
Second, Myburgh flagged differences between section 12A and section
107. In particular, he noted that section 12A enumerated favored purposes for
fair use not contained in section 17. Myburgh thereby suggested that section
12A was far broader than section 107. But many of the additional purposes
for fair use identified in section 12A reflect purposes favor by U.S. courts in
fair use cases. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that parody
could be fair use in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music. 7 Similarly, U.S. courts
have found that fair use permits digital preservation by libraries. Myburgh
claimed that the U.S. Court of Appeals in Authors Guild Inc. v. HathiTrust, 8
did not so hold, but he misread that decision and overlooked the lower court’s
holding that it affirmed. Moreover, there is a significant body of U.S. cases
permitting digitization to create large databases that serve a variety of socially

6

Israeli courts reject the fair use defense in 70% of cases, while U.S. courts’ rejection rate is
only 40%. Further, although the statutory language of the Israeli fair use exception is almost
identical to Section 107, Israeli courts impose an additional requirement on defendants:
providing attribution to the original material. Neil Netanel and Niva Elkin Koren,
Transplanting Fair Use Across the Globe: A Case Study Testing the Credibility of U.S.
Opposition,
Hasting
L.J.
(forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3598160.
7
8

510 U.S. 569 (1994)
755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014)
BAND

7

Analysis of Woods and Myburgh Comments on CAB

useful purposes, including internet search, text and datamining, and
plagiarism detection. 9
Third, Myburgh misunderstood the operation of section 12A (and section
107). Even if the purpose of a use coincides with a purpose enumerated in
subsection 12A(a) (or the chapeau of section 107), that is merely the starting
point of the analysis. In determining whether the use is a fair use, a court must
take into “all relevant factors,” including but not limited to the four factors
listed in subsection 12A(b). The heavy lifting of the exception is done by
subsection 12A(b), not 12A(a). Significantly, there is significant overlap
between the four factors set forth in subsection 12A(b) and the three-step test.
The “purpose and character of the use” in factor (iii) matches the first step,
whether the use is a “special case.” The “amount and substantiality” of the
use in factor (ii) and whether “such use serves a different purpose from that
of the work affected” in factor (iii)(aa) corresponds to the second step,
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work.” And “the substitution effect
of the act upon the market for the work” in the fourth factor matches the third
step, whether the use “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.” Additionally, the four factors set forth in subsection 12A correspond
to the four fair use factors contained in section 107, as interpreted by the U.S.
courts.
Finally, Myburgh stated that because the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and the Portfolio Committee did not explicitly take the threestep test into account in developing its “hybrid model grounded in fair use,”
there is “a material risk of South Africa coming into conflict with its
obligations under Berne and TRIPS.” As noted above, the three-step test is
so vague that it provides national legislatures with no meaningful guidance
concerning the permissible exceptions. Far more useful are the body of
existing exceptions adopted around the world. It is obvious DTI carefully
considered exceptions in the U.S., the EU, and other jurisdictions with
modern copyright laws. There is nothing in the CAB’s hybrid model that
doesn’t have precedent in another jurisdiction that it considered to afford a
high level of copyright protection.
2. Translation.
Woods raises questions concerning the compatibility of the section
12B(1)(f) right of a person giving or receiving instruction to translate a work
with the three-step test. Woods does not explain the possible incompatibility
of this exception with the three-step test; she simply asserts it. However, the
exception is highly circumscribed: the translation can only be done for
noncommercial purposes; the translation only can be used for personal,
educational, teaching, judicial proceedings, research, and professional advice

9

See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v.
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 640 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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purposes, provided that the use does not exceed the extent justified by the
purpose; and the translated work cannot be communicated to the public for
commercial purposes. Taking into account the Max Planck Declaration’s
understanding that the three-step test should be interpreted in a manner that
respects the legitimate interests of third parties, particularly with respect to
cultural, social, and economic development, the translation exception
complies with the three-step test. Given the multiplicity of languages used in
South Africa, and the history of Apartheid resulting in many people not being
able to read English and Afrikaans, this translation right is completely
appropriate to enable all communities to participate fully in the cultural and
economic life of South Africa.
3. Education.
Woods likewise questions the three-step compatibility of section 12D(3),
which allows educational institutions to copy an entire book into a course
pack if a license is not available from the rightsholder on reasonable terms
and conditions. She asserts that the systematic use of entire works without
payment of equitable remuneration “would unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the authors as well as the publishers as successors in
title.” Yet she overlooks that this exception applies only when a license is not
available on reasonable terms. If the publisher is seeking to impose
unreasonable terms on an educational institution, no legitimate interest is
being prejudiced by free use, only an illegitimate windfall profit. Hence, this
exception does not implicate the three-step test. Moreover, the reasonable
terms standard appears in other copyright laws—for example, the U.S.
Copyright Act’s exception for libraries and archives. 10 Indeed, Woods herself
recommends a reasonable terms standard with respect to the library
exceptions, discussed below.
Additionally, the Max Planck Declaration observes that an exception does
not conflict with the normal exploitation of a work if it is based on an
important competing consideration. Education of an impoverished
population certainly qualifies, particularly when the publisher refuses to
license works on reasonable terms.
4. Libraries.
Woods implies that several of the provisions of the section 19C exception
for libraries, archives, museums, and galleries (“GLAMs”) may not comply
with the three-step test, but doesn’t assert directly that the provisions are not
three-step compatible. Further, she does gives insufficient weight to the
public service mission of these institutions. Moreover, the activities permitted
by section 19C are allowed in the United States and the European Union.
a.

Remote access to sound recordings and audiovisual works.

10

See 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)(2). See also 17 U.S.C. § 108(c)(1) and (e) (“cannot be obtained at
a fair price”).
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Section 19C(4) permits a GLAM to provide remote access by means of a
secure computer network. Woods states that “it is a matter of interpretation
whether this provision is compatible with the three-step test.” She
acknowledges that “there is a valid argument that the use of material in
libraries and other institutions outside the premises of such institutions is
necessary for the purposes of distance education, etc.” Nonetheless, to
“safeguard the normal exploitation reserved for rightsholders,” Woods
recommends limiting the exception to situations where the work is not
“commercially available to users on reasonable terms.” However, many
educational institutions in the United States and Canada provide remote
access to works via secure computer networks under a fair use or fair dealing
theory, even if the work is commercially available to users on reasonable
terms. There is no reason for South African students and researchers to have
less access to works than counterparts in the United States or Canada.
b.
Missing parts.
Section 19C(6) permits a GLAM to procure a copy of a missing part of a
work in its collection from another GLAM. Woods notes that many national
laws condition this copying on the commercial unavailability of the missing
part on reasonable terms. She suggests adding such a proviso here “in order
to safeguard the normal exploitation of the works and ensure that there is no
unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the rights owners.”
Although Woods refers to the three-step test, she doesn’t actually state that
the three-step test would require such a proviso. Nor could it. The GLAM
already purchased a copy of the work, and a rightsholder could not anticipate
that a part of that copy would go missing. Thus, replacement of a missing part
of a copy of a work is not a normal exploitation of that work, and a
rightsholder is not prejudiced by an uncompensated replacement of a missing
part.
c.
Format-shifting for preservation.
Section 19C(7) permits a GLAM to format shift a work for preservation
purposes. Woods acknowledges that “provisions to this effect are for
important reasons increasingly commonplace in national legislation.” She
hastens to add that “the production or sale of older works and recordings in
new formats is…also becoming a normal part of their commercial
exploitation.” She thus suggests a commercial unavailability on reasonable
terms proviso “in order to safeguard the normal exploitation of the works and
ensure that there is no unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of
the rights owners.” Once again, Woods does not actually state that the threestep would require such a proviso. As with missing parts, the exception in its
current form clearly meets the three-step test. The GLAMs have already
purchased copies of the works in their collections. Rightsholders have no
reasonable expectation of selling the same work to a GLAM more than once.
And GLAMs should not be prevented from engaging in important
preservation activities because they do not have the budget to purchase the
same work repeatedly in different formats.
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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It should be noted that GLAMs in the United States have digitized
millions of works for preservation purposes without considering whether they
were commercially available under reasonable terms. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the digital preservation of
over 10 million volumes constituted fair use in Authors Guild Inc. v.
HathiTrust. 11 Moreover, Article 6 of the European Union’s Digital Single
Market (“DSM”) Directive permits cultural heritage institutions “to make
copies of any works or other subject matter that are permanently in their
collections, in any format or medium, for purposes of preservation of such
works or other subject matter.” The DSM Directive does not limit this
exception only to works that are not commercially available under reasonable
terms.
d.
Orphan works
Section 19C(9) is an orphan works provision; it permits a GLAM to make
a copy of a work when the permission of the rightsholder “cannot, after
reasonable endeavor, be obtained or where the work is not available by
general trade or from the publisher.” Woods states that the compatibility of
this provision with the three-step test is “difficult to assess” because the
provision does not limit the uses the GLAM institution could make of the
work. Accordingly, Woods recommends that the institution be allowed to
make a single copy for its collection or the collections of another GLAM
institution. This limitation is far narrower than the European Orphan Works
Directive, which allows a cultural heritage institution to make orphan works
in its collection available to the public, including online. The Israeli orphan
works provision is similarly expansive.
e.
Retracted works
Section 19C(11) permits a GLAM to reproduce a published work which
has been retracted, and to make the work available to the public for
scholarship, research or other legal use. Woods states that “it seems difficult
to reconcile” the permissibility of the use of retracted copies with the threestep test, because such use “might in practice nullify the effect of the
withdrawal of the work and thus unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests
of authors.” Here, too, Woods doesn’t directly say that provision is three-step
incompatible. This is because international treaties do not provide authors the
exclusive right to retract works after publication. If a GLAM has a copy of a
work in its collection, the GLAM can lend a copy to the public, even if the
rightsholder has retracted the work.
5. People with disabilities
Some stakeholders complained that the exception for people with
disabilities, section 19D, was inconsistent with the WIPO Marrakesh Treaty
because it applied to all disabilities, not just print disabilities. Woods
correctly refutes this argument by noting that “the Republic of South Africa
11

755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014)
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has the ability to adopt a national exception or limitation that applies to all
persons with disabilities.” 12 Her concern with section 19D is that it “does not
contain a number of provisions that would be needed to benefit from the
provisions of the Marrakesh Treaty, and in particular the cross-border
provisions.” However, she does not identify these provisions. Instead, she
states that the “goal of the Marrakesh Treaty is to harmonize limitations and
exceptions to benefit” people with print disabilities, and to that end, urges
adoption of the definitions and approaches contained in the Marrakesh
Treaty.
Contrary to Woods’ assertion, the goal of the Treaty is not
“harmonization;” it is minimum standards. The Marrakesh Treaty makes
abundantly clear that contracting parties have great flexibility in how to
implement the Marrakesh Treaty’s provisions. Article 10 of the Treaty
provides that “Contracting Parties may fulfill their rights and obligations
under this Treaty through limitations or exceptions specifically for the benefit
of beneficiary persons, other limitations or exceptions, or a combination
thereof, within their national legal system and practice. These may include
judicial, administrative or regulatory determinations for the benefit of
beneficiary persons as to fair practices, dealings or uses….” To be sure, the
Treaty does specify one approach contracting parties may use to implement
the Treaty, but it makes abundantly clear that contracting parties can adopt
other approaches. 13 Woods notes that “most implementing legislation
incorporates the concept of authorized entities as the main actors in crossborder exchanges,” but so does section 19D; it just uses a different term, “an
organization that serves people with disabilities.” 14 In short, Woods fails to
demonstrate that section 19D falls short of the Marrakesh Treaty.
TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES
Woods indicates that the CAB’s provisions concerning technological
protection measures (“TPMs”) may be too narrow to satisfy the requirements
of the WCT and the WPPT. 15 However, the language of these treaties
concerning TPMs is very general. Article 11 of the WCT simply provides
that “Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures
that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under
12

Myburgh conceded that the Marrakesh Treaty permits adoption of an exception not limited
to people with print disabilities. He further acknowledged that the UK and Australia have
such broader exceptions. Nonetheless, he questioned whether section 19D’s application to
all disabilities exceed the “special cases” requirement of the three-step test.
13
See Marrakesh Treaty arts. 4(3) (“A Contracting Party may fulfill Article 4(1) by providing
other limitations or exceptions in its national copyright law”); 5(3) (“A Contracting Party
may fulfill Article 5(1) by providing other limitations or exceptions in its national copyright
law”).
14
Myburgh made the same error as Woods.
15
Conversely, Myburgh does not suggest that the CAB’s provisions relating to TPMs violates
the requirements of the WCT or the WPPT.
WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their
works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by
law.” Article 18 of the WPPT contains similar language. The plain language
of these provisions simply requires penalties for the act of circumventing a
TPM for the purpose of facilitating a copyright infringement.
In 1998, the United States chose to implement this language in a far more
elaborate manner, with a prohibition on the development and sale of devices
that circumvent copy controls, as well as the development and use of devices
that circumvent technologies that control access to works. When this
legislation was pending before the U.S. Congress, Bruce Lehman, the U.S.
Undersecretary of Commerce who had advocated the adoption of WCT art.
11 and WPPT art. 18, conceded that the U.S. implementation went far beyond
the requirements of the WCT and the WPPT. The EU followed the overbroad
US approach in the Information Society Directive in 2001. Nonetheless, the
U.S. and EU implementations are what Woods is demanding of South Africa.
She faults the CAB’s definition of a technological protection measure in
section 1 because it excludes a measure that controls access to a work for a
non-infringing purpose. But as noted above, WCT art. 11 and WPPT art. 15
address controls on infringement, not controls on access. She criticizes the
definition of technological protection measure circumvention device even
though WCT art. 11 and WPPT. Art. 15 impose no requirements concerning
circumvention devices, just acts of circumvention. And she attacks the
prohibition in Section 27(5A) on the manufacture or distribution of TPM
circumvention devices because it applies only to devices likely to be used to
infringe copyright, and not to access a work. Significantly, there is a split in
the U.S. courts concerning whether circumventions of access controls with
no nexus to infringement violate the prohibition on circumvention of TPMs.16
Thus, the changes Woods demands not only exceed the requirements of the
WCT and the WPPT, they may exceed the standards of U.S. law.
CONCLUSION
As the National Assembly reconsiders the CAB, it should recognize that
the issues identified by Woods and Myburgh concerning compliance with
international treaties are grossly overstated. If the National Assembly
concludes that any of these concerns have merit, they can be addressed by
narrow amendments.

16

Compare Chamberlain Group, Inc., v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
with MDY Indus. LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
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